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I. INTRODUCTION 
Dr Christopher Forsyth must be congratulated for his unshakeable resolve 
and indefatigable energy in holding the line on ultra vires. He has stoically 
resisted the onslaught of academic, judicial and extra-judicial writings on 
the common law foundations of judicial review. With fortitude, he has 
defended the conceptual linkage of ultra vires and shunned argument about 
judicial power being deeply embedded in the common law. Again, in the 
pages of this review, Dr Forsyth joins with Linda Whittle in defence of the 
ultra vires doctrine - as establishing the one true constitutional justification 
of judicial review.1 He reaffirms what he and his followers dub the 'modified 
doctrine of ultra vires'. 
This reply identifies the strained logic of the (so-called) modified doctrine 
and refutes the forced reconciliation it attempts. The title of this reply refers 
to the writer's article, 'The Demise of Ultra Vires - Judicial Review in the 
New Zealand Courts' (hereafter 'The Demise of Ultra Vires').2 That article 
recorded the debate over ultra vires in the United Kingdom and observed 
the emergence of a methodology of judicial review (termed 'constitutional 
review')3 that demonstrates the potency of the courts' inherent jurisdiction 
at common law. This reply summarises the modified doctrine of ultra vires 
and addresses the writers' specific arguments of refutation against (as 
they quaintly put it) 'a voice from New Zealand'. Their article is a revised 
version of a presentation Dr Forsyth gave to the Public Law class at the 
University of Canterbury in September 2001, in which he repeatedly directed 
aquestion at the judges: 'Who areyou [the judge] to interfere in the exercise 
of a discretion entrusted to a democratically accountable decision-maker 
by a democratically elected Parliament?'4 I am happy to oblige Dr Forsyth, 
although I question whether these or any other words are capable of shaking 
his resolve. 
To presage what follows: the ultra vires doctrine is ahistorical in its claim to 
clothe the courts with constitutional justification, is artificial in its linkage to 
presumed parliamentary intent, is misty-eyed in its deference to popular 
democracy, and is perverse in reserving to the courts a servile, mechanistic 
role. The opening pages of this reply rehearse some of the arguments already 
*      Professor of Law, University of Canterbury. 
1 C Forsyth and L Whittle, 'Judicial Creativity and Judicial Legitimacy in Administrative 
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canvassed in the debate. The article to which Forsyth and Whittle refer 
('The Demise of Ultra Vires') contains a fuller account of the contortions 
of ultra vires scholarship.5 The ensuing pages of this article probe the 
relationship of the political and judicial branches and take the debate into 
new territory concerning statutes and common law method. 
II. COMMON LAW FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The administrative lawyer, Stanley de Smith, observed that 'judicial review 
in England has significant roots in history'.6 The following identifies the 
common law origins of judicial review from the 13th century, when the 
superior courts split off from the King's Council and developed their inherent 
jurisdiction. The shortcomings of positivist methodology forced Forsyth and 
Whittle to contest this ancient jurisdiction. 
Forsyth and Whittle embarked upon a misplaced search for the legal source 
of the courts' powers. They asked: 'Where was the legal rule or rules 
that gave the power to the judges to intervene?'7 In truth, there was no 
legal rule or rules but only the accommodation of the common law. They 
observed the expansion of the courts' powers over the past 50 years and 
asked: 'Where was the constitutional justification for this extension of judicial 
review?'8 The answer, of course, was where it had always been -
embedded in common law method. Forsyth and Whittle contested this and 
drew their linkage to ultra vires. Immediately, they encountered a problem. 
The historical record of the superior courts long predated ultra vires 
scholarship: 
The ultra vires model represents a uniquely modern view of judicial review. For a doctrine 
whose pre-eminent purpose is to legitimise judicial review, it is profoundly ahistorical. 
De Smith observed that the basic principles that secured the courts' jurisdiction were 
established by the end of the seventeenth century and noted that the techniques by which 
these principles were implemented "have survived into the modern age".9 
The ultra vires doctrine was adapted from mid-19th century public utilities 
law.10 The expression 'ultra vires' was used to describe independent 
statutory corporations that had exceeded their specific statutory powers.11 
This presented a dilemma. If ultra vires scholarship reached back only 150 
years, how might it account for the prerogative writs that had been in use 
by the courts for several centuries? Forsyth and Whittle were driven to the 
historically indefensible proposition that the 'idea of an age old common 
law right to judicial review may be doubted'. u One is mystified as to their 
explanation. They cited a dictum of Holt CJ in a decision reported in 1700, 
as a coup de grâce to end all argument. In R v Glamorganshire 
Inhabitants,13 Holt CJ stated: 
5 Joseph, 'The Demise of Ultra Vires', above n 2. See also P Craig, 'Ultra Vires and the 
Foundations of Judicial Review' [1998] Cambridge Law Journal 63; P Craig, 'Public Law, 
Political Theory and Legal Theory' [2000] Public Law 211.   The full list of citations on 
the foundations of judicial review is given in the writer's article above n 2, 356. 
6 S A de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, 1973) 25. 
7 Forsyth and Whittle, above n 1, 453. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Joseph, 'The Demise of Ultra Vires', above n 2, 367. 
10 Ibid 366 (citing de Smith, above n 6, 83). 
11 See A-G v Great Eastern Railway Co (1880) 5 App Cas 473 (HL). 
12 Forsyth and Whittle, above n 1, 459. 
13 (1700) 1 Ld Raym 580; 91 ER 1287, 1288. 
[T]his Court will examine the proceedings of all jurisdictions erected by Act of Parliament. 
And if they, under pretence of such Act, proceed to encroachjurisdiction to themselves 
greater than the Act warrants, this court will send a certiorari to them. 
This dictum established nothing but that which the words stated: the court 
will intervene to correct an excess of power. The question for the King's 
Bench was whether a statutory power to raise money to repair a bridge 
authorised the raising of money to repair weirs that supported the bridge. 
Holt CJ issued his ex cathedra to denounce the objection to the court's 
jurisdiction. It had been objected that, 'because it was a new jurisdiction 
erected by a new Act of Parliament, the trust of the execution of which is 
reposed in the justices ... this Court has nothing to intermeddle with it' .14 
That objection raised Holt CJ's ire because it challenged what the King's 
Bench had been doing for over 300 years: namely, intervening to ensure 
that justices and inferior courts and tribunals complied with the law that set 
the limits of their jurisdiction and powers. Holt CJ's dictum did not transform 
the court's inherent (common law) powers of review into parliamentary or 
statutory emanations. The courts before and after the Glamorganshire 
case affirmed their common law powers of review independently of the 
co-ordinate role and power of Parliament.15 
The common law is the foundation of judicial review in two senses: first, the 
principles of good administration that comprise our administrative jurisprudence 
are developed by the courts in exercise of their inherent jurisdiction at common 
law, and secondly, the courts' jurisdiction to develop these principles is itself 
based in and part of the common law. The power of the superior courts is 
inherent, not prescribed. Unlimited jurisdiction is an innate feature of a superior 
court and is self-referential of its very existence.16 The only limits on inherent 
jurisdiction are those that the superior courts choose to recognise. In R v 
Bedwellty Justices, Exp Williams17 Lord Cooke of Thorndon reflected that 
a 'superior court of general jurisdiction, such as the High Court of Justice, 
has jurisdiction to determine... the limits of its own jurisdiction'. Nowhere 
did the law positively empower the original courts (the Court of Common 
Pleas, the Court of Exchequer, or the Court of King's Bench) to adjudicate 
disputes and develop the law. The Court of King's Bench originally sat in the 
presence of the King and claimed jurisdiction to correct the proceedings of 
other courts (including those of the Common Pleas), and to control justices 
and officials if they acted irregularly or without jurisdiction. From the 13th 
century onwards, the King's Bench crafted its administrative jurisprudence 
around the great prerogative writs of habeas corpus, quo warranto, prohibition, 
certiorari and mandamus.18 The prerogative writs, and the principles that 
14 Ibid 580; 1287. 
15 See, eg, Bagg's Case (1615) 11 Co Rep 93b; R v Barker (1762) 3 Burr 1265. 
16 See the excellent discussion in HKSAR v Siu Yat Leung [2002] 2HKC 175, 179-180 per 
Deputy Judge McCoy SC ('[t]he very right to grant bail is innate in a superior court of 
unlimited jurisdiction'). 
17 [1997] AC 225, 232.    Hence the general common law principle that no court of co 
ordinate jurisdiction may sit in review of itself.   See Re Kray [1965] Ch 736, 745, followed 
in HKSAR v Siu Yat Leung [2002] 2HKC 178. 
18 The writs were not, in truth, 'prerogative' at all since they were available to subjects as well 
as the Crown from earliest times. However, the historic identification of the writs with the 
King's Bench ascribed to them the character of prerogative, so that it remains acceptable 
to continue to refer to the prerogative orders as a particular group of remedies. See Joseph, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, above n 3, 940-2. For development 
of the judicial review jurisdiction at common law, see Joseph, 'The Demise of Ultra Vires', 
above n 2, 363-4 and 367-8. 
secured the court's jurisdiction, were firmly established by the end of the 
17th century, long before the broadening of the franchise and the growth of 
democracy.19 This historical lineage, reaching back to the origins of the 
common law courts, betrays attempts to elevate ultra vires into a conceptual 
framework for judicial review. 
III. PRESUMED PARLIAMENTARY INTENT 
For ultra vires protagonists, all roads lead to Parliament and notional or 
presumed parliamentary intent. For them, the courts discharge a subordinate 
role under Parliament's patronage. They exist primarily to uphold 
Parliament's legislation and to police its delegations to the executive. 
Protagonists discount any historical constitutional role, such as upholding 
the rule of law, securing the constitutional balance, or standing between the 
individual and the State. Yet, these functions are the constitutional birthright 
of the superior courts. The judiciary is indubitably a part of government 
(alongside the executive and Parliament) and is invested with authority to 
develop the law. The courts expound upon not only the common law but 
also statute law through the ascription of meaning to statutes in actual 
cases.20 At one time, the common law claimed to control the exercise of all 
public power - prerogative and parliamentary. The King's Bench extolled 
elementary notions of reason and fairness for checking parliamentary power 
and asserted the right to adjudge the validity of Parliament's statutes: 'for 
when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, 
or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge 
such Act to be void'.21 The constitutional struggles of the 17th century 
eventually confirmed Parliament's power and quietedjudicial assertions that 
the common law controlled legislation. Following the Glorious Revolution, 
the judges conceded the superiority of statute law overthe common law and 
returned their attention to checking executive interference or abuse. The 
King's Bench had no reason to express gratitude to Parliament when it 
crafted its administrative jurisprudence. The judges' constitutional standing 
was independent of Parliament and the King, although it was not until 1700 
that the judges enjoyed protection against arbitrary removal from office.22 
From medieval times, judicial power existed to resolve disputes according 
to law and 'to correct ... any manner of misgovernment'.23 The King's 
Bench developed the prerogative writs to facilitate the court's supervision 
over matters of administration. For Lord Mansfield, the writ of mandamus 
was intended to supplement and develop the law, 'upon all occasions where 
the law has established no specific remedy, and where injustice and good 
government there ought to be one' .24 Parliament and the courts exercised 
co-ordinate, constitutive authority - Parliament through legislation, the courts 
through principles of common law. Judicial power evolved in tandem with 
legislative power but it was never dependent on it: 'It was only in the age 
19 De Smith, above n 6, 25. 
20 See commentary below. 
21 Dr Bonham's Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 113b, 118a per Coke CJ.    See TFT Plucknett, 
'Bonham's Case and Judicial Review' (1926) 40 Harvard Law Review 30, 35-45 for a 
review of the cases from the reign of Edward II that Sir Edward Coke relied on. 
22 See the Act of Settlement (1700) 12 & 13 Will III, c 2. 
23 Bagg's Case (1615) 11 Co Rep 93b, 98a.   See P Craig, 'Public Law, Political Theory and 
Legal Theory' [2000] Public Law 211, 231-2. 
24 R v Barker (1762) 3 Burr 1265, 1267. 
of popular democracy that lawyers seized on the fiction of presumed 
legislative intention as the foundation of judicial review'.25 The coupling of 
judicial review and presumed parliamentary intention occurred from the 
mid-19th century, when universal suffrage led to the expansion of 
government and broad delegations to the executive. The ultra vires doctrine 
threatened to obscure - and for a short while did obscure - the historical 
foundations of judicial review. With a return to the courts' common law 
foundations, the repudiation of the doctrine leaves no vacuum to fill. 
IV. MODIFIED DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES 
Forsyth and Whittle believe that a modified ultra vires doctrine remedies 
the shortcomings of the traditional doctrine. But their modified doctrine is 
game-playing. It draws not on actual, but on deemed or presumed 
parliamentary intent. It is game-playing to deem or presume something to 
be that which it is not. In 'Heat and Light: A Plea for Reconciliation', 
Forsyth postulated that his modified doctrine had silenced the critics of 
ultra vires review.26 The critics, he ventured, held to the view that: 
Unless Parliament clearly intends otherwise, the common law will require decision-
makers to apply the principles of good administration as developed by the Judges in 
making their decisions.27 
By comparison, proponents of the modified doctrine held to the view that: 
Unless Parliament clearly indicates otherwise, it is presumed to intend that decision-
makers must apply the principles of good administration drawn from the common law 
as developed by the Judges in making their decisions.28 
This 'reconciliation' acknowledges two things: first, that the principles of 
good administration the courts apply are judicially developed at common 
law, and secondly, that Parliament (had it given any thought at all to the 
matter) is presumed to intend the application of these principles. Forsyth 
and Whittle claimed that it was neither 'unreasonable' nor 'implausible' to 
impute such an intention to Parliament.29 In reality, ultra vires protagonists 
accept that Parliament does not give a moment's thought to these matters. 
In his earlier writings, Forsyth was disarmingly candid. He acknowledged 
'what is plainly an artificial construct: the intention of Parliament' .30 In 
their section headed 'Artificiality - real or apparent?', Forsyth and Whittle 
concede the artificiality of their doctrine where legislation is ambiguous or 
where conditions are judicially implied into a statute.31 But they are 
unrepentant; they nevertheless ask that the courts uphold the intention of 
Parliament. We are asked to forgive the fiction and beggar belief. The 
need to 'modify' the ultra vires doctrine was a concession that it lacks 
explanatory power. The modified doctrine is game-playing that even its 
proponents concede is not worth the 'heat and light' it generates.32 The 
25 Joseph , ‘The Demise of Ultra Vires', above n 2, 364. 
26 C Forsyth, 'Heat and Light: A Plea for Reconciliation' in C Forsyth (ed), Judicial Review 
and the Constitution (2000). 
27 Ibid 396. 
28 Ibid (emphasis added). 
29 Forsyth and Whittle, above n 1, 456 quoting from 'Heat and Light: A Plea for Reconciliation', 
above n 26, 397. 
30 Forsyth, 'Heat and Light: A Plea for Reconciliation', above n 26, 396.  
31 Forsyth and Whittle, above n 1, 456. 
32 Forsyth, 'Heat and Light: A Plea for Reconciliation', above n 26, 396. 
traditional doctrine holds that, when the courts intervene to correct defective 
decision-making, they are simply policing the limits of Parliament's 
delegation. This explanation produces instant constitutional justification for 
judicial review. When the courts intervene in this way, they are vicariously 
drawing upon the authority of the people as expressed through Parliament. 
The modified doctrine continues to draw this linkage, as the justification 
for judicial review. Forsyth and Whittle punctuated their article with 
references to the unelected judges and the elected representatives of the 
people in Parliament. Their thesis reduces to a superficial appeal to 
representative democracy and presumed parliamentary intent. Their 
uncomplicated depiction of the judicial role defies realities when the courts 
uphold the requirements of good administration. Anisminic established a 
legal landmark that relegated the language of ultra vires. This decision 
extended the scope of judicial review to cover any material error of law 
made in the course of applying a statutory power.33 Decisions that were 
intra vires were reviewable if the decision-maker had failed to comply 
with the requirements of fairness, had had regard to irrelevant considerations 
or had failed to have regard to relevant ones, had failed properly to promote 
the statutory purposes, or had failed to comply with the requirements of 
fairness. In the wake of Anisminic, it made no sense to perpetuate the 
language of ultra vires. 
The extension of judicial review to non-statutory bodies ended all pretensions 
to pure ultra vires doctrine.34 Forsyth and Whittle acknowledged as much 
but sought to consign this development to a legal byway. 'For present 
purposes', they wrote, 'it is enough to remark that there is a common law 
principle that prevents the abuse of monopoly power and that is the 
justification for judicial intervention in non-statutory cases'.35 They would 
indulge in Procrustean scholarship - find a convenient legal categorisation 
and force conformity with it. They cited Forsyth's earlier writings where 
he had attempted to accommodate judicial review of non-statutory bodies 
as a special application of Sir Matthew Hale's principle of a business 
affected with a public interest.36 Hale's ancient common law principle is 
inapposite as non-statutory bodies may be judicially reviewable, whether 
or not they exercise monopoly power as required under Hale's principle. 
Contrary to what Forsyth and Whittle suggest, the courts have applied 
ordinary principles of justiciability to non-statutory bodies. Any decision of 
a public nature (statutory or otherwise) is potentially reviewable. In R v 
Panel on Take-overs and Mergers; Ex p Datafin plc,37 the English Court 
of Appeal held that decisions of the Take-overs Panel were reviewable, 
although the panel exercised de facto powers under a self-assumed, 
regulatory jurisdiction. For Lord Steyn, the 'decisive factor' in that case 
was not the source of the panel's power but the nature of the functions it 
exercised.38 He said of Datafin: 'The Court of Appeal regarded the 
33 Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, above n 3, 761-3. 
34 See R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex p Lain [1967] 2 QB 864 (DC); R v 
Panel on Take-overs and Mergers; Ex p Datafin plc [1987] 1 QB 815 (CA); R v Panel on 
Take-overs and Mergers; Ex p Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146 (CA); Electoral Commission v 
Cameron [1997] 2 NZLR 421 (CA). 
35 Forsyth and Whittle, above n 1, 453 (n 3). 
36 See my discussion and citations in 'The Demise of Ultra Vires', above n 2, 366-7.  
37 [1987] 1 QB 815 
38 Lord Steyn, 'Democracy Through Law' (2002 Robin Cooke Lecture, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 18 September 2002), 15. 
common law as the true foundation of this branch of public law'.39 The 
New Zealand courts have likewise dismissed the source of power as a 
determining criterion. The exercise of power is reviewable if it is 'in 
substance public' or has 'important public consequences'.40 The courts 
have held that non-statutory counterparts to the Take-overs Panel in New 
Zealand are reviewable, although they exercise de facto rather than legally 
prescribed powers.41 
The modified doctrine of ultra vires pursues an unobtainable goal: to explain 
away deficiencies in a doctrine that is pedagogically flawed. It seeks the 
pretence of 'fig leaves and fairy tales' -the fixation of ultra vires protagonists.42 
Lawyers are sufficiently robust and mature to do away with polite fictions. 
The independent power and functioning of the courts is deeply, historically 
rooted, and is vital to the prescriptive ideal of the rule of law. Without an 
independent system of courts, representative democracy could not vouchsafe 
the principles of liberty, justice and equality before the law. 
V. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Proponents of the ultra vires doctrine appeal to the symbolism of 
representative democracy, as an instant justification for the courts' powers 
of judicial review. The courts quash decisions that Parliament notionally 
has not authorised the decision-maker to make: 'By enforcing the boundaries 
of Parliament's delegation, the courts tapped the "will of the people" as 
expressed through Parliament'.43 Unrepentant democrats denounce the 
unelected judges and deify the elected representatives of the people. For 
Forsyth and Whittle, judicial review was an exceptional remedy. It allowed 
an 'unelected judiciary' to review decisions made under laws enacted 'by 
the elected representatives of the people in Parliament' (their emphasis).44 
Hence their question: 'Who are you [the judge] to interfere in the exercise 
of a discretion entrusted to a democratically accountable decision-maker 
by a democratically elected Parliament?'45 'How', they ask, 'consistently 
with the democratic nature of our constitution ... can a non-elected element 
of the constitution override the decision of a democratic element?'46 
Judicial review was an exceptional remedy because of its implications for 
democratic decision-making. The remedy lacked legitimacy but for 
Parliament's lifeline to representative democracy. Classical ultra vires 
doctrine held that, when judges quashed decisions, they were simply policing 
the limits of Parliament's delegation to the executive. They were, in short, 
upholding the democratic foundations of the constitution. When the 
Anisminic revolution scotched that simplification, Forsyth and others 
contrived their modified doctrine: that Parliament was presumed to intend 
the application of the common law principles of good administration. Ultra 
3 9   Ibid. 
40 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps [1999] 3 NZLR 1, 11 (Henry, Keith and 
McGechan JJ) (CA). 
41 See, eg, Electoral Commission v Cameron [1997] 2 NZLR 241 (CA). In 'Democracy 
Through Law', above n 38, 15, Lord Steyn cited this decision as the New Zealand equivalent 
of Datafin. 
42 See particularly C Forsyth, 'Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the 
Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review' (1996) 55 Cambridge Law Journal 122. 
43 Joseph, 'The Demise of Ultra Vires', above n 2, 366. 
44 Forsyth and Whittle, above n 1, 454. 
45 Ibid 453. 
46 Ibid 454. 
vires protagonists readily concede that the attribution of a parliamentary 
intention is fictional and contrived.47 The fiction of presumed parliamentary 
intent was erected to maintain the pretence that all roads lead to Parliament. 
A further defect in the modified doctrine centres on the proposed justification 
- popular democracy. Representative democracy is paraded as a 
constitutional trump, a closure to all argument. But consider. What is 
democracy? Lord Hailsham explored that question and immediately 
identified what it is not. 'We sometimes talk', he observed, 'as if democracy 
were a single, easily recognized type of political community. A moment's 
reflection will show that this is not so' .48 For him, 'democracy' was simply a 
statement about the 'centre of gravity where sovereignty and ultimate 
responsibility reside'.49 Modern mass democracy engages the people as a 
method of choosing a government; the principle of universal suffrage (one 
person, one vote) empowers the people to vote for a government of their 
choice. Winston Churchill proclaimed the right to vote 'the foundation of all 
democracy'.50 'At the bottom of all the tributes paid to democracy', he 
reflected, 'is the little man, walking into the little booth'.51 In New Zealand 
the right to vote is exercised every three years; in Australia, Canada and the 
United Kingdom the period between elections is slightly longer, at between 
4-5 years. That, at core, is modern mass democracy - the right to vote every 
3-5 years. It is not, as some ideologues suggest, a Utopian ideal or unqualified 
good. Churchill was quick to disabuse the notion that democracy was 'perfect' 
or 'all-wise'.52 'Democracy', he observed, 'is the worst form of government 
except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time'.53 Abraham 
Lincoln dignified democracy with the depiction: 'Government of the people, 
by the people, for the people'.54 Oscar Wilde was more avowedly irreligious. 
'Democracy', he quipped, 'means simply the bludgeoning of the people, by 
the people, for the people'.55 
Hailsham disdained the tokenism of the word 'democracy'. 'We have no 
right to speak of democracy', he said, 'unless we define what we mean by 
it, and, even when we have done so we have no right to assume that 
everything democratic is good'.56 Representative democracy is at base a 
formal concept, denoting universal suffrage. The right to vote can be of 
varying value, depending on whether it is exercised in a single or multi-
party State, or whether it is a right of direct or indirect election. The Soviets 
proclaimed a right to vote that was next to worthless for those who railed 
against a centrally controlled State under Communist rule. This was 
disempowerment through democracy; the people could vote but not change 
the party in power. Electoral charades discount the value of democracy in 
many parts of the world. In 2002 the Iraqi people endorsed Saddam Hussein 
47 See Forsyth 'Heat and Light: A Plea for Reconciliation', above n 26; Forsyth and Whittle, above 
n 1, 456. 
48 Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy (1978) 33. 
49 Ibid 36. 
50 F B Czarnomski, The Wisdom of Winston Churchill (1965) 99. 
51 Ibid. 
52 W S Churchill, 'Speech in the House of Commons, 11 November 1947', in A Jones (ed), 
Chambers Dictionary of Quotations (1996) 265. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Winston Churchill also idealised this form of participatory democracy: See Czarnomski, above n 
50, 99. 
55 O Wilde, Sebastian Melmoth, 'The Soul of Man under Socialism' in A Jones (ed), Chambers 
Dictionary of Quotations (1996) 1076.  
56 Hailsham, above n 48, 33. 
as President for a further seven years. Their endorsement was 
overwhelming (the authorities reported 99 per cent voter support) but it 
was an election without a choice. Only one name appeared on the ballot 
paper - Saddam's. New Zealanders have greater choice and can change 
their Governments at the ballot box, but only through a system of indirect 
election under mixed-member proportional representation (MMP). The New 
Zealand people diluted the value of their vote when they surrendered the 
right of direct election under first-past-the-post elections. Under MMP the 
people elect not a Government but a mix of constituency and party-list 
members. Post-election manoeuvrings determine the make-up of 
government, sometimes with surprising outcomes. After the first MMP 
elections in 1996, the New Zealand First Party held the balance of power 
and played king-maker in determining which of the two centrist parties 
(National or Labour) would be in government. After eight weeks of intensive 
negotiations, New Zealand First joined with the centre-right National Party 
to form a Government, to the dismay and chagrin of many.57 Voters were 
disillusioned that proportional representation through the party-list system 
had removed their right to vote out a Government. 
Even in Britain, where the right of direct election survives, democracy can 
be a hollow concept. Once the 'little man' has departed the 'little booth', 
representative democracy entails no other formal public participation. 
Between elections, the people have no formal mechanism or plebiscite by 
which to endorse or censure their Governments. These truths are wasted 
on ultra vires protagonists, who uphold democracy as a constitutional trump. 
Stripped of the rhetoric, their argument reduces to repetition of unstructured 
expressions such as 'democratic legitimacy', 'non-elected element'/ 
'democratic element,' and the 'unelected judiciary' and 'elected 
representatives of the people in Parliament' (Forsyth's and Whittle's 
emphasis).58 It is woeful to engage in repeated assertion. '[I]t is a pure 
illusion', wrote Hailsham, 'to suppose that answers will be forthcoming by 
the mere repetition of the word "democracy" as if it were an incantation 
against the evil eye'.59 Majoritarian rule can be as tyrannical as any 
totalitarian regime, if it is not tethered to liberal ideals of tolerance, freedom 
and respect for human dignity. 
The expressions representative democracy and liberal democracy are 
not synonymous. By failing to define their terms, Forsyth and Whittle confuse 
the two expressions. The concept of representative democracy, while 
essential to the legitimacy of government, lacks moral content.60 It implies 
universal suffrage and the right to representation but says nothing about 
how government is to be carried on. The term 'liberal democracy' implies 
more. This term has substantive content, embracing a range of humanitarian 
values - liberty, justice, equality etc - that identifies Western political culture. 
57 See the writer's commentary, 'Constitutional Law' [1997] New Zealand Law Review 209, 
210-7. 
58 See, eg, Forsyth and Whittle, above n 1, 454 and 460. The writers made repeated reference 
to the phrases quoted and to such phrases as 'democratically elected Parliament' and 
'democratic nature' of the constitution. 
59 Hailsham, above n 48, 34.  
60 Compare Dixon v Attorney-General (British Columbia) (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 247 where 
McLachlin J described equal suffrage and the right to vote as 'fundamental'.   See also Prem 
Singh v Prasad (Unreported, Supreme Court of Fiji, 29 August 2002) CBV0001/2002S, 22 
(to be reported [2003] NZAR 1) where Dame Sian Elias described the rights to representation 
and free and fair elections as 'human rights'. 
Representative democracy derives legitimacy from an independent judiciary 
that can vouchsafe these liberal democratic values. For Sir Robin Cooke, 
the legal system reduced to 'two complementary and legally unalterable 
principles: the operation of a democratic legislature and the operation of 
independent courts'.61 The courts accept responsibility to uphold Dicey's 
pre-eminent meaning of the rule of law - government according to law -
and to protect the citizenry from invasion or abuse.62 When elections are 
called, political leaders treat the people and ply for their vote. And when it 
is all over, the people look to the courts for vindication of their rights, 
sometimes against encroachment by the Governments they elect. 
Recently, Lord Steyn identified the role of the judiciary in a modern 
democracy.63 Judicial power did not derive legitimacy from representative 
democracy, but rather the reverse: 
The democratic ideal involves two strands. First, the people entrust power to the 
Government in accordance with the principle of majority rule. Secondly, basic values of 
liberty and justice for all and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
guaranteed. For protection citizens must look to the courts. Tensions between these 
ideals arise from time to time. The executive and the judiciary are not on the same side. 
How the balance should be struck is a task that can only be entrusted to the judgment 
of a wholly independent and impartial judiciary. Only such a system has democratic 
legitimacy.64 
Forsyth and Whittle aggrandise Lord Steyn's first strand (the principle of 
majority rule) but relegate his second strand (liberty, justice and respect for 
human rights and the rule of law). Without the twin pillars of a democratic 
legislature and independent courts - standing not in each other's shadow 
but sufficiently apart - the constitutional system would topple and crash to 
the ground. 
VI. CHALLENGE TO PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNITY 
Forsyth and Whittle discover a darker side to the common law challenge to 
ultra vires. The challenge unmasked is, they claim, a naked attack on the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. For them: 'The idea ... that ultra 
vires is deficient because it is artificial forms part of a wider argument that 
strikes at the heart of parliamentary sovereignty'.65 Common law theorists, in 
truth, 'assert the role of the courts overthat of Parliament' amounting to a 
'judicial usurpation of power'.66 The writers condemn this attack as 
subversive of our constitutional foundations. To uphold common law 
requirements of fairness challenges Parliament's exclusive and inalienable 
power to stipulate the requisites of valid decision-making. They end their 
article contented that, 'through continued deference to the will of 
Parliament, via ultra vires, a challenge to sovereignty is averted, and 
constitutional orthodoxy remains intact'.67 
We should ask two questions. First, why should it be subversive to challenge 
parliamentary sovereignty? What makes this doctrine sacrosanct and 
immune from challenge, when no other doctrine enjoys this immunity? Dicey 
61 Sir Robin Cooke, 'Fundamentals' [1988] New Zealand Law Journal 158, 164. 
62 A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed, 1965) 202. 
63 Lord Steyn, 'The Case for a Supreme Court' (2002) 118 Law Quarterly Review 382. 
64 Ibid 388 (emphasis added). 
6 5 Forsyth and Whittle, above n 1, 459. 
66 Ibid 459 and 460. 
67 Ibid 462. 
proclaimed parliamentary sovereignty the fundamental postulate of the 
Westminster constitution. He endorsed Alpheus Todd, whom he called a 
'very judicious writer' .68 Todd inveighed against any limitation on Parliament, 
proclaiming its 'entire freedom of action ... to legislate for the public 
welfare'.69 These writers glorified parliamentary power and elevated its 
illimitability into an article of faith. But in reality, Dicey's doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty was simply a factual statement about legislative 
power (a statement, moreover, that can be and has been contested). The 
doctrine contains no intrinsic truth, principle or moral virtue. It guarantees 
Parliament's right to legislate but lays down no prescription as to how it 
should legislate. It is therefore perplexing why it should be subversive to 
challenge this conception of legislative power, when it has only factual and 
not normative force. The writer, for one, defends the constitutional structure 
but rejects the description 'parliamentary sovereignty', as representing a 
distortion of the parliamentary and judicial roles. It is entirely legitimate to 
ask: Would New Zealand or the United Kingdom benefit were either to 
draw upon the experience of other western States and limit its legislative 
powers? 
The second question is more probing. Does the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty connect with constitutional and legal realities - in particular 
common law method? The answer is 'no', if one takes the absolutist 
conception of legislative power trumpeted by Forsyth and Whittle. It is a 
gross misrepresentation that it is the total, token role of the courts to receive 
Parliament's words, interpret them (according to what Parliament is 
presumed to but did not really intend) and apply them, without critical 
appreciation of the constitutional, legal or social framework. On this view, 
Parliament hands down meaning on tablets of stone. The courts take 
Parliament's statutes, faithfully decipher their contents, and declare the 
law. This formalist depiction reserves to the courts a servile, mechanistic 
role, when in truth they are engaged in a collaborative, constitutive enterprise 
with Parliament. The term 'statutory interpretation' is a misnomer. The 
courts do not interpret legislation; they are more actively engaged in bringing 
meaning to the statutory text. 
A statute is a communication. As the judiciary is the authoritative expositor 
of legal meaning, a statute is ultimately a communication directed at the 
courts. Statutory communications require both recipient (the court) and 
communicator (Parliament) to attach a shared meaning or significance to 
the enacted word. A communication involves a speaker or writer of words, 
and a receiver (a listener or reader). Communications are interactive and 
there can be no communication without a receiver; words that are never 
received have physical manifestation only, as sounds or signifiers on paper. 
In the process of communication, listeners or readers are actively engaged. 
Meaning is not posited through preordained, objectively correct 
interpretations. Rather, listeners or readers construct meaning around the 
words used. Context is crucial. In the study of linguistics, reception theory 
holds that meaning is brought to spoken or written words against a 
background of shared values, assumptions and beliefs. Stanley Fish pioneered 
68 Dicey, above n 62, 67. 
69 A Todd, Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies (1880) 192, quoted by Dicey, 
above n 62, 67-8.   For discussion, see Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in 
New Zealand, above n 3, 481. 
the 'interpretative community' as a means of explicating legal meaning: 
'Meaning, says Fish, inheres in an institutional structure within which one 
hears utterances as already organized with reference to certain purposes 
and goals (values, understandings) shared by particular interpretative 
communities'.70 Theorists such as Fish contend that the quest to divine 
legal meaning in text alone (eg parliamentary enactment) is misconceived; 
meaning is rather 'created', not discovered. 'Interpretation', Fish wrote, 
'is not the art of construing but the art of constructing'.71 Constructing 
meaning from the statutory text draws on interpretive conventions 
(shared beliefs, understandings etc) and the particular contextual setting: the 
specific facts before the court (around which statutory meanings are 
constructed) and the institutional values of the legal system (which 
inform and/or constrain statutory meanings). In some cases the judicial 
ascription of statutory meaning is 'interstitial' and seemingly faithful to the 
statutory text; in other cases it almost entirely informs the meaning of the 
statutory words used. The courts have never blanched from reading 'or' 
as meaning 'and',72 or 'may' as meaning 'must' (or vice versa),73 if that is 
what the judicial intuition dictates. For the House of Lords, substituting 
'and' for 'or' was a 'strong and exceptional interference with a legislative 
text' - 'surgery rather than therapeutics' .74 It is intellectually facile to seek 
to reduce constitutive reconstruction to a function of interpretation. In the 
business of law-creation through legislation, Parliament and the courts 
exercise coordinate but distinct roles: Parliament through the power of 
initiation and enactment of legislation, the courts through the power 
authoritatively to assign statutory meanings to legislation in resolving disputes 
in actual cases. 
Forsyth and Whittle assert judicial usurpation of power under the theory 
that judicial review is common law-based. They engage the intellectual 
firepower of 'fig leaves and fairy tales'.75 They advocate an extreme form 
of legal formalism; that Parliament's legislation has a single, objectively 
ascertainable meaning, reserving to the courts a mechanistic (non-
constitutive) role in applying legislation. This representation belies the 
experience of the law. Language, when used to formulate rules, is too 
indeterminate to dictate single, objectively 'correct' solutions when disputes 
arise.76 The meanings the courts ascribe to statutory rules must assimilate 
70 P A Joseph, 'Beyond Parliamentary Sovereignty' (1989) 18 Anglo-American Law Review 
91, 113 referring to S Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? (1980) ch 13.   See the endorsement 
of communication theory in Savril Contractors Ltd v Bank of New Zealand [2002] NZAR 
699 (HC) discussed below.   See also Hamilton City Council v Fairweather [2002] NZAR 
477 (HC). 
71 Fish, ibid 327. 
72 See, eg, R v Oakes [1959] 2 QB 350 ('and' read as 'or'); R v Federal Steam Navigation Co 
[1974] 1 WLR 505 ('or' read as 'and'). 
73 See, eg, Simpson v Attorney-General [1955] NZLR 271 (CA & SC) ('must' read as 'may'); 
Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 (HL) ('may' read as 
'must'). 
74 R v Federal Steam Navigation Co [1974] 1 WLR 505, 522 (per Lord Wilberforce).   See J 
Burrows, Statute Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, 1999), 191-202 for examples of judicial 
'manipulation' of the statutory text (albeit articulated in the conventional language of 
statutory interpretation). 
75 The reference is to Forsyth, above n 42. 
76 For criticism of formalist method see R M Unger, Knowledge and Politics, (1975) 92. 
Compare J Evans, 'Questioning the Dogmas of Realism' [2001] New Zealand Law Review 
145, 153-5 who argues that Unger's scepticism is based on failure to distinguish problems 
of meaning from problems of conflict between meaning and judgment.   Evans' critique 
accepts the problem of indeterminacy but simply transposes the problem from the exercise 
conventional linguistic understandings and received common law values 
(or as some prefer 'principles of constitutionality').77 
VII. PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Judicial candour is a splendid thing and sometimes judges oblige. In Savril 
Contractors Ltd v Bank of New Zealand,78 Baragwanath J gave explicit 
recognition to communication theory. For him, Parliament and the courts 
are each engaged in law-creation through legislation, albeit at different 
stages of the process and in different 'task-related' ways (Parliament through 
initiating legislation, the courts through explicating and applying it).79' [T]he 
function of the Court on construction', observed Baragwanath J, 'is neither 
to usurp Parliament's unchallengeable authority to make our laws, nor to 
pretend to seek the will-o'-the wisp of a "parliamentary intention”’.80 His 
Honour rejected the metaphor of a parliamentary intention, '[when] the 
reason for the debate on construction is the very absence of a sufficiently 
clear expression of parliamentary will'.81 Statutory words were to be 
ascribed meanings that conformed to the institutional values of the legal 
system. These meaning depended, said Baragwanath J, 'not solely on the 
black letter of Parliament's language but also upon the other considerations 
of public policy which it is the duty of the Court to consider ... it must 
decide what construction will best conform with the settled precepts by 
which the Courts determine the meaning of statutory language.'82 Ultra 
vires protagonists laud the will of Parliament and marginalise the 
judicial role, as one of subservient obedience to the statutory text (all roads 
lead to Parliament). Occasional judicial statements lend superficial support. 
A court may eschew a strained interpretation and apply (what it calls) the 
literal or plain meaning of an enactment, as a matter of expressed judicial 
obligation. Declared judicial preference for literal meanings is symptomatic 
of judicial under-reaching ingrained in our habits of legal thought. Literal 
meanings faithfully serve Parliament's (supposed) intended purpose. The 
courts are quick to expound upon the parliamentary intention but often, 
simply (one suspects), to disclaim responsibility for unfavourable judicial 
outcomes. In Savril Baragwanath J identified what lay behind the metaphor 
of a parliamentary intention: 
Bennion employs the metaphor of a parliamentary intention, which is however no 
more helpful than that of a company's intention ... Bennion's references to 'Parliament's 
intentions' could be substituted by a reference to the judge-made precepts ... the 
of ascertaining meaning to the exercise of applying meaning. He accepts the need for 
making exceptions or corrective extensions to statutory rules in problematic cases, although 
such exceptions or extensions may yield results outside the authors' judgment or 
contemplation. This view proposes that meaning can exist as an abstraction, removed 
from the entire range of communications by which meaning is conveyed. Meaning is 
rather contextual, being organised and conveyed by reference to the world around us. 
Evans' (so-called) problem of 'conflict between meaning and judgment' is a problem about 
meaning itself. 
77 See below, nn 91-92. 
78 [2002] NZAR 699 (HC). 
79 See also Hamilton City Council v Fairweather [2002] NZAR 477, 491 where Baragwanath J 
observed that both Parliament and the courts make law: 'Parliament by enacting our statutes, 
necessarily in language of some generality; the Courts . . .  by construing statutes - making 
decisions as to detail by filling in the areas that Parliament has inevitably left blank'. 
80 [2002] NZAR 699, 704. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid 704-5. 
Courts do not simply deduce meaning from the words Parliament uses; they also 
attribute meaning to such words. The Courts do this ... against a background of societal 
norms and values that influence the meaning of the statutory words used.83 
When construing a statute, a court might legitimately uphold the 'literal' or 
'plain' meaning, not because Parliament has linguistically ordained it, but 
because that meaning accords with the 'settled precepts' and 'considerations 
of public policy' that guide the court's intuition in the particular case.84 
However, the converse will often also apply, where the courts feel compelled 
to reject literal or plain meanings. Privative clauses carry a universal literal 
meaning. They are directions to the courts to 'keep out' but they never 
achieve their purpose. The courts subject privative provisions to a judicial 
determination that Parliament does not intend to empower conclusively 
decision-makers to determine questions of law, including questions that 
affect the limits of a decision-maker's powers. In Peters v Davison,85 the 
Court of Appeal ruled that the judicial review powers of the High Court are 
based on the 'central constitutional role of the court to rule on questions of 
law'. Questions of law remain always the responsibility of the courts of 
general jurisdiction. It is moot whether even a 'supreme law' privative 
clause, prescribed by the constitution itself, will successfully oust the review 
jurisdiction of the superior courts. The constitutional responsibility of the 
courts may be at its greatest when called upon to condemn action that 
violates human rights or subverts the constitutional laws of the State. In 
Prem Singh v Prasad,86 Dame Sian Elias (dissenting) refused to uphold a 
finality clause under the Fiji constitution as a constitutional trump. She 
emphasised the 'principle of legality, the most important attribute of the 
rule of law, and the context of human rights',87 as grounds for holding that 
the finality clause did not oust the court's appellate jurisdiction in electoral 
matters. In Peters v Davison, the Court of Appeal affirmed the rule of law 
rationale of judicial review, that' [t]he essential purpose is to ensure that 
public bodies comply with the law'.88 
The courts are jealous to guard against usurpation under statutory ouster 
or finality clauses. Despite Parliament's ostensible purpose, the courts hold 
that Parliament does not intend to oust their jurisdiction and deny them 
their constitutional role. Some courts have expressed this rule as a 
presumption but it is a presumption that constitutionally is incapable of 
displacement.89 All of the (so-called) presumptions of statutory interpretation 
are, in truth, statements of judicial policy - the 'judge-made precepts'90 or 
what Sir Rupert Cross91 and Lord Hoffmann termed 'principles of 
83 Ibid 705 (citing Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, above n 3, 
506-7 and Joseph, 'The Demise of Ultra Vires', above n 2, 368). 
84 Ibid 704-5.    Baragwanath J's terms 'settled precepts' and 'judge-made precepts' are 
interchangeable, so too the phrases 'considerations of public policy' and 'background of 
societal norms and values'. 
85    [1999] 2 NZLR 164, 192. 
86 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Fiji, 29 August 2002) CBV0001/2002S (to be reported 
[2003] NZAR 1). 
87 Ibid 23. 
88    [1999] 2 NZLR 164, 192. 
89 See, eg, Re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374 (HL); O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 
2 AC 237 (HL); Bulk Gas Users Group Ltd v A-G [1983] NZLR 129 (CA); Prem Singh v 
Prasad (Unreported, Supreme Court of Fiji, 29 August 2002) CBV0001/2002S, 18-9 (Elias 
J dissenting). For discussion, see Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New 
Zealand, above n 3, 766-8. 
90 Savril Contractors Ltd v Bank of New Zealand [2002] NZAR 699, 705 (Baragwanath J). 
91 See J Bell and G Engle (eds), Cross on Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed, 1995) 166. 
constitutionality'.92 The courts have applied these 'presumptions' although 
there was no linguistic ambiguity in the statutory wording under construction.93 
Cross wrote that: ' [T]hese presumptions of general application not only 
supplement the text, they also operate at a higher level as expressions of 
fundamental principles governing both civil liberties and the relations between 
Parliament, the executive and the courts. They operate here as constitutional 
principles ...' 94 These principles embrace core constitutional values that the 
courts will seek to uphold, even as against potentially intrusive legislation. By 
supplementing the enacted word, constitutional principles posit 'meaning' and 
provide the sub-text of statutory construction. The courts will mould 
Parliament's statutory language so as to preserve access to the courts, uphold 
the presumption of innocence, protect the liberty of the individual, give statutes 
prospective rather than retrospective effect, and retain intact the common 
law rights of citizens.95 
In recent cases, English courts have elevated the judge-made precepts into 
a principle of legality that redefines the constitutional relationship between 
the branches. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex p 
Simms,96 Lord Hoffmann declared that Parliament must 'squarely confront 
what it is doing and accept the political cost'. 'Fundamental rights', he said, 
'cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words'.97 For another judge, 
'[g]eneral words would not suffice'.98 In Thorburn v Sunderland City 
Council,99 Laws LJ reconciled developments and ruled that the doctrine of 
implied repeal was limited and could not apply to constitutional or human 
rights statutes: 'Ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed ...  
[c]onstitutional statutes may not'.100 Two members of the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal have likewise emphasised the need for emphatic words. 
Parliament, they said, 'must speak clearly if it wishes to trench upon 
fundamental rights'.101 To speak clearly, Parliament must understand the 
significance of its legislation and not proceed under a misapprehension, 
mistake or error of law. On this approach, unconscionable legislation that is 
enacted in error or ignorance is valid but inoperative ('disapplied'). For 
Elias CJ and Tipping J, this approach established a method of disapplying 
statutes that avoids a confrontation with Parliament. These judges would 
refuse to attribute to Parliament an intention to give effect to a 
misapprehension, mistake or error of law.102 
Judges who have demanded that Parliament 'speak clearly' are in the 
vanguard of forging doctrine that can give balanced account of the political-
judicial relationship. These judges have jettisoned the pretence of applying 
interpretative presumptions or aids to ascertain what Parliament may (or 
92 Rv Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 .  
93 Bell and Engle, above n 91, 166. 
94 Ibid. 
95 See further, Joseph, 'The Demise of Ultra Vires', above n 2, 369-70, for a raft of legal values 
and common law principles that recent English and New Zealand decisions have upheld. 
96 [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (HL). 
97 Ibid. 
98 R v Lord Chancellor; Ex p Witham [1998] QB 575, 586 (Laws J). 
99 [2002] 4 All ER 156, 183-7 (QBD). 
100 Ibid 185. 
101 R v Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37, 50 (Elias CJ and Tipping J) (emphasis added). 
102 For discussion, see Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, above 
n 3, 509-12 and the writer's commentary 'Constitutional Law' [2001] New Zealand Law 
Review 449, 451-7.   Compare Evans, above n 76, 166-70. 
may not) have intended. When they apply the principles of constitutionality, 
the courts intuitively shape the meaning of legislation in actual cases. These 
principles are, observed Lord Hoffmann, 'little different from those which 
exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a 
constitutional document'.103 These words give especial meaning to Lord 
Steyn's observation that 'Parliament does not write on a blank sheet'.104 The 
courts recognise Parliament's right to legislate but claim their role as the 
expositors of legal meaning. Neither branch has legitimacy without the 
independent existence and functioning of the other. They are, as it were, 
Siamese twins, separate personalities but joined at the hip. 'Ultimately', 
said Lord Steyn, 'common law and statute law coalesce in one legal 
system' .105 In his Robin Cooke Lecture, 'Democracy Through Law', Lord 
Steyn added a third dimension, the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 
1998, which incorporates for United Kingdom law the European Convention 
rights.106 The application of these rights in the municipal courts sharpens 
the focus on institutional values and reinforces the constitutionality of 
common law rights. The independent functioning of the branches is key. In 
R v Lord Chancellor; Ex p Witham,107 Laws J (as he then was) observed 
that, in the absence of a written constitution, constitutional rights were 
based in the common law and were 'logically prior' to the democratic 
(political) process. Many of the liberal democratic values embedded in the 
common law are now codified in Bills of Rights and other domestic and 
international human rights instruments. Their codification represents a 
distillation of ethical values but it does not re-establish the rights as statutory 
creations by gift of Parliament. The liberty of the person and freedoms of 
expression, movement and association are common law creations that have 
a long and illustrious history, pre-dating even Magna Carta and the English 
Parliament. The constitutional content of common law rights will continue 
to evolve through the independent functioning of the courts across the entire 
spectrum of adjudication. The law of judicial review developed through 
common law method and will naturally assimilate domestic and international 
human rights developments. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The writer's article, 'The Demise of Ultra Vires', canvassed the history of 
judicial review and the attempt to promote ultra vires as the foundation of 
judicial review. It concluded that the ultra vires doctrine is 'formalist in 
method, is profoundly ahistorical, and fails in its claim to provide a workable 
theory of judicial review'.108 'Try as it may, the modified doctrine remains 
fictional and contrived'.109 The mantra of popular democracy cannot cloak 
the deeply imbued, common law foundations of judicial review. From their 
inception, the courts have developed the law in the pursuit of just and 
workable solutions and have intervened to protect the citizenry from executive 
interference. No theory founded on fiction and formalism can explicate 
these fundamental constitutional roles. 
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The last word is for Lord Steyn who delivered the inaugural Robin Cooke 
Lecture, 'Democracy Through Law'.110 He explored the twin strains of 
the democratic ideal - the principle of majority rule and an independent 
and impartial judiciary. He concluded: 'By overwhelming weight of reasoned 
argument the ultra vires theory has shown to be a dispensable fiction'.111 
Lord Steyn enshrined these words by renouncing his earlier observations 
in Boddington v British Transport Police 112 There, with the agreement 
of the other Law Lords, he affirmed the orthodoxy that the ultra vires 
doctrine legitimised judicial review. Ultra vires protagonists placed great 
store in Boddington, as ending all speculation about the conceptual 
foundations of judicial review. Forsyth and Whittle expressed indignation 
that the writer should suggest (in their words) that: 'Lord Steyn may, 
notwithstanding the line he took in Boddington, favour the rule of law'.113 
'This', they ventured, 'can hardly be considered the demise of ultra vires in 
the United Kingdom'.114 The writer had (notwithstanding Boddington) 
canvassed Lord Steyn's dicta as a ringing affirmation of the common law 
foundations of judicial review.115 In the House of Lords decisions Ex p 
Pierson116 and Exp Simms,117 his words lifted from the page like beacons, 
illuminating the role of the rule of law and common law method in judicial 
review. My raising of the authorial eyebrow was vindicated when, in 
'Democracy Through Law', Lord Steyn renounced his views in 
Boddington. He commended the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision 
in Peters v Davison118 (which explicitly adopted a rule of law rationale for 
judicial review) and concluded: 
In a democracy the rule of law itself legitimises judicial review. I now accept that the 
traditional justification in England of judicial review is no longer supportable.119 
Lord Steyn's pursuit of the principle of constitutionalism cut through the 
incantation that deifies democracy and discounts judicial power. He 
encapsulated the vitality of the common law, as a force that will strengthen 
and promote (what he termed) the 'constitutionalisation' of our public law.120 
The ultra vires doctrine is a pesky distraction that has no relevance to the 
legal world he sketched. That world has already moved on, ironically (some 
may say) by reclaiming the courts' common law past. 
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